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REQUIRING THE STATE TO JUSTIFY SUPERMAX
CONFINEMENT FOR MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS:
A DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
BRITTANY GLIDDEN & LAURA ROVNERt
ABSTRACT
The Eighth Amendment has long served as the traditional legal ve-
hicle for challenging prison conditions, including long-term isolation or
"supermax" confinement. As described by Hafemeister and George in
their article, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis of
Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a
Mental Illness, some prisoners with mental illness have prevailed in
Eighth Amendment challenges to prolonged isolation. Yet an equal or
greater number of these claims have been unsuccessful. This Essay con-
siders why some of these cases fail, and suggests that one reason is that
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not contain a well-defined doctri-
nal framework for courts to use in considering a prison's proffered "le-
gitimate penological interest" in a given condition of confinement, in-
cluding prolonged supermax confinement. In this Essay, we explore the
idea that the federal disability discrimination statutes may offer a more
tailored methodology for challenging solitary confinement of mentally ill
prisoners. Unlike an Eighth Amendment claim, in which a prisoner typi-
cally challenges the aggregate of supermax conditions, a disability dis-
crimination approach requires courts to assess the individual conditions
that comprise supermax confinement, a process that requires an analysis
of whether discrimination is occurring vis-a-vis each component depriva-
tion. Finally, the Essay concludes by examining the disability discrimina-
tion approach in the context of claims asserted by the Civil Rights Clinic
of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law on behalf of a mental-
ly ill man who has been in isolation for over a decade.
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INTRODUCTION
A man is taken away from his experience of society, taken away
from the experience of a living planet of living things, when he is
sent to prison.
A man is taken away from other prisoners, from his experience of
other people, when he is locked away in solitary confinement in the
hole.
Every step of the way removes him from experience and narrows it
down to only the experience of himself.
There is a thing called death and we have all seen it. It brings to an
end a life, an individual living thing. When life ends, the living thing
ceases to experience.
The concept of death is simple: it is when a living thing no longer
entertains experience.
So when a man is taken farther and farther away from experience,
he is being taken to his death.
-Jack Henry Abbott
As described in The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on In-
mates with a Mental Illness, the practice of housing prisoners in pro-
longed isolation or "supermax" conditions has grown significantly over
the past few decades.2 Today, at least 25,000 prisoners across the country
are held in long-term solitary confinement. 3 Many of them have mental
1. JACK HENRY ABBOTr, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON 52-53
(1981).
2. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness,
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2012).
3. Ryan Devereaux, Solitary Confinement on Trial: Senators Hear From Experts on Prison
Reform, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 19, 2012, 12:25 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/I 9/solitary-confinement-trial-us-senators. Some esti-
mates place the number of people in solitary confinement closer to 80,000. Id.; see also Reassessing
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illnesses that caused or contributed to their segregation, and even those
without a pre-diagnosed condition suffer mental health harms as a result
of prolonged isolation.
The idea that supermax confinement can cause or worsen mental
health issues is both intuitively obvious and supported by psychological
studies.4 This psychological trauma results not only from the characteris-
tic separation from other people but also from the confluence of extreme-
ly restrictive conditions that comprise solitary confinement. As noted by
Hafemeister and George, this collection of conditions is remarkably uni-
form. Typical segregation involves being locked up alone in a small cell
for twenty-three hours or more each day.5 Meals generally come through
a slot in the solid steel door of the cell, as do any communications with
prison staff.6 Most prisoners are permitted to exercise one hour a day in a
fenced area that resembles a "dog run," though even this time is spent
alone.7 Segregated prisoners usually are denied many services and pro-
grams provided to non-segregated prisoners, such as educational classes,
job training, drug treatment, work, or other kinds of rehabilitative pro-
gramming. Access to law libraries, family visits, and phone calls is very
limited. And prisoners in solitary confinement typically are not permitted
any human touch, save for when the correctional officers shackle them to
escort them from location to location.9
Students at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law's Civil
Rights Clinic (CRC or the Clinic) are all too familiar with the use of
Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 112th
Cong. (June 19, 2012) [hereinaflter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (citing the Bureau of
Justice statistics).
4. Dr. Craig Haney, a psychologist who has studied the effects of solitary confinement for
nearly thirty years and has visited dozens of solitary-confinement units across the country detailed
the effects of these conditions generally in an expert report in the Clinic's case Silverstein v. Federal
Bureau ofPrisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2011 WL 4552540 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011). In that report, he
summarized decades of research, concluding that
[tIhe psychological effects of solitary or isolated confinement are well understood.
Knowledge of these effects is based on literature developed over many years, by re-
searchers and clinicians from diverse backgrounds and perspectives. The literature is em-
pirically consistent-virtually every one of the studies conducted has documented the
psychologically precarious state of persons confined under conditions of penal isolation,
and many address in detail the pain and suffering that isolated prisoners endure. It is also
theoretically sound; there are numerous reasons why one would expect long-term isola-
tion, the absence of meaningful social interaction and activity, and the other severe depri-
vations that are common under conditions of solitary confinement to have harmful psy-
chological consequences.
Report of Craig William Haney at 3-4, Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471 (D.
Colo. Apr. 13, 2009), 2009 WL 8514046.
5. Dr. Haney testified at Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Reassessing Solitary Confine-
ment, where he detailed the conditions generally seen in isolation or supermax units. See Hearings,






long-term solitary confinement in both state and federal prisons in Colo-
rado. One of six clinics comprising the Student Law Office,' the Civil
Rights Clinic represents prisoners in cases challenging the constitutional-
ity of their prison conditions." The law school is 100 miles away from
Colorado's "prison valley," an area near Cafion City that holds thirteen
prisons, several of which are supermax facilities.12 This region contains
the nation's only federal supermax-the U.S. Penitentiary, Administra-
tive Maximum (ADX)-as well as three solitary-confinement facilities
run by the state system, the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC). Many of the Clinic's clients have been held in solitary con-
finement for years and, in the case of one client, for decades.' 3 Having
conducted interviews and corresponded with hundreds of prisoners in
these facilities, the Civil Rights Clinic has made the constitutionality of
conditions in solitary confinement the focus of its current caseload. Over
the past five years, our cases have challenged the living conditions at
various supermax facilities, the processes by which prisoners are placed
and retained in these facilities, and the treatment of prisoners with mental
illness in supermax prisons.14
In The Ninth Circle of Hell, Hafemeister and George assert that
long-term solitary confinement of mentally ill prisoners violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
They offer this assertion both normatively and descriptively, setting forth
the theoretical basis for why isolation of mentally ill prisoners should be
unconstitutional and citing case law for the proposition that many courts
have so held. As a normative matter, we agree that holding mentally ill
prisoners in long-term segregation should be illegal. But we do not be-
lieve that courts are reaching this conclusion with the consistency or ease
10. The Student Law Office (SLO) is the in-house clinical education program at the Universi-
ty of Denver Sturm College of Law. Founded in 1904, the SLO is one of the oldest clinical programs
in the country. In the SLO, students develop their legal knowledge, lawyering skills, and profession-
al values while working with underserved clients and communities to address urgent problems,
influence public policy, and improve the quality of legal problem solving.
11. A brief overview of all of the Civil Rights Clinic's cases can be found at University of
Denver Sturm College of Law's website. Civil Rights Clinic Cases, STURM COLL. OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, http://law.du.edu/index.php/law-school-clinical-program/civil-rights-
clinic/civil-rights-clinic-cases (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
12. See Welcome to Prison Valley, TIMECOM PHOTOS,
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2009197_2173542,00.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2012).
13. One of the Clinic's clients has been in solitary confinement for over twenty-nine years.
See Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2011 WL 4552540, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 2011).
14. The Civil Rights Clinic operates as most law-school clinics do, though our docket is
somewhat unusual in that our cases are litigated in federal court and generally take several years to
complete. See generally Paul D. Reingold, Why Hard Cases Make Good (Clinical) Law, 2 CLINICAL
L. REV. 545, 545 (1996). CRC students who have been admitted to practice by court order represent
clients under the supervision of clinic faculty. While enrolled in the CRC, the student attorneys
perform all of the required litigation tasks on their cases, including client counseling, propounding
and responding to discovery requests, taking and defending depositions, drafting motions and briefs,
and conducting trials.
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portrayed by Hafemeister and George. While acknowledging that a
state's "legitimate penological interest" in holding a prisoner in segrega-
tion is a factor considered by the courts in determining the constitutional-
ity of solitary confinement, Hafemeister and George assert that this fac-
tor will, or at least should, "readily falter" in cases involving prisoners
with mental illness.15 By contrast, our review of the cases and our expe-
rience litigating Eighth Amendment cases on behalf of individual plain-
tiffs is that an asserted "legitimate penological interest" plays a signifi-
cant, and potentially determinative, role in judicial decisions of the con-
stitutionality of solitary confinement.1 6 We believe that when prison offi-
cials claim that isolation is necessary for correctional purposes, such as
safety and security, courts often will hold that there is no violation of the
Eighth Amendment-even when the prisoner is mentally ill.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. In Part I, we describe the failure
of Eighth Amendment doctrine to explicitly consider a state's interest in
a challenged prison condition and discuss the ways in which the legiti-
macy of the state's interest nevertheless pervades-and sometimes dic-
tates-the outcome of Eighth Amendment claims challenging the impo-
sition of solitary confinement on mentally ill prisoners. In Part II, we
share our thinking about an alternative legal approach the CRC is explor-
ing to address the overuse of long-term solitary confinement for people
with mental illness. This approach, which is grounded in the federal dis-
ability rights statutes, may provide an additional vehicle for some people
with mental illness to challenge some of the component conditions that
comprise supermax confinement.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
THE UNDEFINED ROLE OF "LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTEREST"
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim that a prison condition is
cruel and unusual, a prisoner must satisfy a two-prong test with objective
and subjective components. The objective prong requires the prisoner to
demonstrate that the challenged condition is sufficiently serious to merit
review, either because it deprives a prisoner of a "basic human need"' 7 or
because the condition presents a "substantial risk of serious harm."' The
15. Hafemeister & George, supra note 2, at 45.
16. This dynamic exists not only in Eighth Amendment cases but also in cases in which a
prisoner challenges prolonged or indefinite placement in solitary confinement as a violation of his
rights under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th Cir.
2012); Silverstein, 2011 WL 4552540, at *1.
17. The Eighth Amendment violation must include "the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see also
Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Eighth Amendment requires jail officials
'to provide humane conditions of confinement by basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shel-
ter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety."' (quoting
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998))).
18. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-38 (1993) (finding sufficiently grave
harm where there was a "substantial risk of serious harm" resulting from second-hand smoke).
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subjective prong requires a showing that prison officials acted with "de-
liberate indifference" in imposing or maintaining the condition despite
knowing about the harm or risk of harm. 19 Notably, the test is silent with
respect to penological interest.
Despite the fact that the Eighth Amendment inquiry does not con-
template a role for the state's penological interest in determining the con-
stitutionality of a prison condition, we agree with Hafemeister and
George that judicial deference to any "legitimate penological interests"
asserted by prison officials is a "significant hurdle" to successful litiga-
tion under the Eighth Amendment.20 Having said that, however, we ques-
tion their conclusion that the penological and administrative concerns
underlying this deference will be overcome in cases in which mentally ill
prisoners are being held in isolation. 2 ' Although it is true that several
class action lawsuits have succeeded in challenging this practice, the
more common lawsuits brought by individual plaintiffs have not consist-
ently fared as well. 22 Many Eighth Amendment cases brought by mental-
19. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
20. Hafemeister & George, supra note 2, at 32.
21. Id. Although Hafemeister and George discuss several cases that hold that mentally ill
prisoners should not be in solitary confinement, these are class action lawsuits. Id. at 25-31. The one
case they cite in which a mentally ill plaintiff lost was an individual suit. Id. at 27-28.
22. We are unaware of any in-depth analysis of the reasons why individual cases have not
fared as well as class actions in challenges brought on behalf of mentally ill individuals. A reading of
the cases offers several possibilities. First, many individual prisoner-plaintiffs are not represented
and cannot afford counsel or expensive mental health experts. Although this distinction is important,
it is not independently sufficient because there are cases where prisoners are represented and these
claims are still dismissed. See, e.g., Home v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1998); Williams v.
Branker, No. 5:09-CT-3139-D, 2011 WL 649845 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2011). Second, class action
cases appear to bear a lower causal burden than cases brought by individual plaintiffs. Typically,
mentally ill plaintiffs must demonstrate that any deterioration in their condition is caused by solitary
confinement and not the course of their disease generally. See generally Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-36
(requiring condition to cause risk). In a single-plaintiff case, it may be difficult to demonstrate this
causal relationship and to exclude other potential causes, such as prison generally, age, or other
factors. See generally Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471, 2011 WL 4552540, at
*18 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011) (denying risk of harm from insomnia because plaintiff failed to
demonstrate "direct connection" between harm and isolation, and relied on general studies regarding
mental harms caused by solitary confinement, which were not found to be persuasive). If the indi-
vidual prisoner-plaintiff has not notably deteriorated in solitary confinement, this may actually count
against him, perhaps because it is believed that the risk of harm going forward is lessened. See
Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F. Supp. 2d 345, 367 (D. Md. 2007) ("It should be noted that Ms. Farmer's
conditions, at least as documented in the record before the court, have not led to the type of violence
and uncontrollable behavior exhibited by the plaintiffs discussed in Jones 'El, whose incarceration in
Supermax unhinged them from any connection to the world around them."). Class action plaintiffs,
however, can rely upon broader data and studies regarding the effects of solitary confinement on
mentally ill people more generally, making the causal proposition easier to prove. See generally
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (relying, in part, on interviews of sixty-five
individuals to demonstrate harm to entire class). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, legitimate
penological interest is harder to demonstrate in the context of a class. When a single plaintiff is
before the court, the prison officials can put on evidence of his crimes and risks in the prison system,
both of which inevitably appear frightening and are often persuasive. See, e.g., Scarver v. Litscher,
434 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he treatment of a mentally ill prisoner who happens also to
have murdered two other inmates is much more complicated than the treatment of a harmless luna-
tic."). In the context of a class action, however, prison officials have a more difficult time providing
compelling evidence, in part, because of the number of class members and the diversity of reasons
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ly ill individuals have lost, failing even under compelling circumstances
to obtain relief.23
At times, these cases explicitly cite legitimate penological interest
as a basis for denying the claim, stating that housing a mentally ill pris-
oner in isolation is not unconstitutional unless it is "without penological
justification."24 For example, in the one individual suit discussed by
Hafemeister and George, Scarver v. Litscher,25 the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the prisoner had endured mental suffering from his
placement in supermax confinement, noting that he had repeatedly
banged his head against the solid wall of the cell.2 6 Despite acknowledg-
ing that these circumstances were disturbing, Judge Posner's opinion
made clear that the courts do not want to interfere with correctional man-
agement of dangerous prisoners.
The murderous ingenuity of murderous inmates, especially in
states such as Wisconsin that do not have capital punishment, so that
inmates who like Scarver are already serving life terms are undeter-
rable, cannot be overestimated. Prison authorities must be given con-
siderable latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal
maniacs without exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary
for security. It is a delicate balance.27
Although not all federal judges express their opinions so bluntly, a simi-
lar underlying sentiment is regularly present in such cases, and may be
28influencing the decision even absent any explicit language.
As a doctrinal matter, how courts assess the role and legitimacy of a
penological interest in a prison condition (including solitary confine-
for their placement in segregation, and also because the pattern of conduct and the impact of solitary
confinement are more apparent.
23. See, e.g., Home, 155 F.3d at 31 (holding that placement of prisoner with mental illness
did not violate Eighth Amendment, in part, because it was not "without penological justification");
Haggins v. Minnesota Comm'r of Corr., No. 10-1002, 2012 WL 983590, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 14,
2012) (finding that placing mentally ill prisoner in disciplinary isolation did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, after extensive discussion of his disciplinary infractions); Farmer, 494 F. Supp. 2d at
370 (finding, as a matter of law, that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to mentally ill
prisoner placed in solitary confinement); Hill v. Pugh, 75 F. App'x 715, 721 (10th Cir. 2003) (deny-
ing Eighth Amendment claim regarding isolation of prisoner with mental illness by finding it did not
meet objective standard); Williams, 2011 WL 649845, at *3 (finding prisoner with mental illness did
not meet standard to show he was likely to be harmed by isolation). But see Washington-El v. Beard,
No. 2:08-CV-01688, 2011 WL 891250, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011) (finding prisoner with
history of severe mental illness "nudged his claim for relief across the line of the conceivable,"
though noting it was a "very close call" to survive a motion to dismiss).
24. Home, 155 F.3d at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Washington-El, 2011
WL 891250, at *5.
25. 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006).
26. Id. at 975.
27. Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
28. See generally Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference
and the Problem ofSupermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1505 passim (2004) (discussing significant
deference given to state penological interests and examining the three class actions cited by Hafe-
meister and George).
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ment) is a significant question, given that the test for whether a condition
violates the Eighth Amendment does not contemplate the role of the
prison's "legitimate penological interest." 2 9 Because of the limits the
federal courts have imposed on the other constitutional rights of prison-
ers, courts are in the habit of deferring to prison officials when they
claim that a particular condition or treatment is necessary.30 Judges are
explicit about the fact that they lack experience in managing prison sys-
tems, and that prison officials should be given wide berth to address is-
sues of safety and security.3 ' As a result, most constitutional protections
are limited for those who are in custody. Yet, the Eighth Amendment
stands in contrast to other sources of rights for prisoners precisely be-
cause prisoners are those whom the Amendment is meant to protect. As
such, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the limits imposed on the oth-
er constitutional rights of prisoners do not apply to claims of "cruel and
unusual punishment" because doing so would thwart its entire purpose:
protecting those who are incarcerated. 32 The Court has explained that
"[t]he full protections of the [E]ighth [A]mendment most certainly re-
main in force [in prison]. The whole point of the [A]mendment is to pro-
tect persons convicted of crimes."3 Accordingly, the Court has held that
affording "deference to the findings of state prison officials in the con-
29. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 819 (2006) (discussing empirical research
that demonstrates that courts defer to penal institutions more than any other government entity, even
when "strict scrutiny" analysis is applied). See generally Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?:
Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 50 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
30. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Although prisoners retain some degree of
their constitutional rights while in prison, many of these give way to legitimate penological interests
of the States. Id. (weighing violation against legitimate interest as part of test); Weidman, supra note
28, passim (discussing the "culture of deference that constrains federal courts from intervening in
prison affairs"). The majority of challenges to violations of prisoners' constitutional rights are exam-
ined under a form of "rational basis" review. Fred Cohen, Penal Isolation: Beyond the Seriously
Mentally Ill, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1017, 1021-24 (2008) (discussing the standard of review
applied by the Supreme Court in several cases involving prisoner's rights). Accordingly, if the prison
has any reasonable basis for acting in the manner that it does, the practice will be upheld. This rea-
sonableness standard is not without critique. Fred Cohen describes Supreme Court decisions regard-
ing the rights of prisoners as "almost nonchalant and consistently out of touch with reality, in consti-
tutionally accepting the most fundamental deprivations imposed on inmates as legitimate conse-
quences of conviction and imprisonment," citing Turner as "part of the contemporary, constitutional
foundation for determining inmate claims to fundamental rights, including First Amendment
claims." Id. at 1021. His observation of the effect of Turner on prisoners'-rights jurisprudence is
incisive: "Turner has evolved into a so-called rule of reasonableness that consistently limits inmate
claims ranging from visits to access to reading material. The flipside of severe judicial limits on
inmate condition claims is the expansion of deference to the opinions-and not necessarily opinions
supported by evidence-of prison officials." Id.
31. See generally Weidman, supra note 28, passim (discussing significant deference given to
state penological interests).
32. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005) ("[T]he integrity of the criminal justice
system depends on full compliance with the Eighth Amendment.").
33. Id. (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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text of the [E]ighth [A]mendment would reduce that provision to a nulli-
ty in precisely the context where it is most necessary." 34
Yet, how this "lack" of deference is to be implemented in the Eighth
Amendment context remains uncertain." Neither the objective nor the
subjective components of the Eighth Amendment test specify how an
asserted penological interest will be considered and whether it can pre-
clude a finding that a particular condition is cruel and unusual. The ab-
sence of an express doctrinal mechanism to consider penological interest
has not rendered it irrelevant to the analysis but rather has permitted
courts to implicitly fold it into both the objective and subjective prongs
of the test.36 This is not entirely surprising; common sense dictates that
we cannot evaluate whether punishment is cruel and unusual without
understanding the reason it is imposed. But without explicit direction as
to how penological interest should be considered-including the weight
it should be given and whose burden of proof it is to demonstrate the
validity of that interest-courts often do the exact opposite of what was
directed by the Supreme Court and defer to prison officials' interests in
determining whether a condition is constitutional.
This failure to scrutinize the legitimacy of an asserted penological
interest is particularly troubling in the context of supermax litigation, in
which the challenge is not to just one condition but rather to a collection
of conditions that, in the aggregate, produce extreme isolation and senso-
ry deprivation. Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoner-plaintiffs argue
that the psychological and physical harm resulting from this confluence
of conditions-twenty-three-hour-per-day lockdown, denial of employ-
ment and educational opportunities, extreme limits on the ability to have
fresh air and exercise, and lack of visits and phone calls-can satisfy the
objective standard38 even though each component condition likely would
be deemed insufficiently serious to warrant Eighth Amendment protec-
tion.39 While combining these conditions assists the prisoner in demon-
strating harm in the form of the deprivation of a human need or a risk of
serious harm, this "sum total" approach also may advantage prison offi-
cials, who are not required to provide a legitimate penological basis for
each of the denials that contribute to that harm. For example, courts do
not ask prison officials to explain why the number of phone calls in a
supermax unit is severely limited and instead only look for justification
for a prisoner's placement in that unit.
34. Id (quoting Spain, 600 F.2d at 193-94).
35. Glidden, supra note 29 (manuscript at 15-16).
36. Id. (manuscript at 7-8).
37. Id. (manuscript at 15-16).
38. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 n.10 (1981) ("Prison conditions alone or in corn-
bination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (finding denial of all visita-
tion for a period of years is not cruel and unusual punishment).
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Against this legal backdrop, prison officials are encouraged to cite
blanket interests of "safety" and "security" as the basis for the multiple
deprivations that comprise solitary confinement. 40 Parsing that general
assertion is difficult, in part, because the decision to place a prisoner in a
supermax unit often follows the adage "when all you have is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail." Prison administrators use solitary confine-
ment for a diverse range of issues: to restrain a prisoner who is acting
violently, as punishment for prisoners who have committed disciplinary
infractions, to protect prisoners who are at risk in the general population,
and as a place to house those awaiting classification or designation.4 1
Additionally, supermax cells are also used for "status-based" reasons
(i.e., to confine those who have been convicted of certain types of crimes
or are believed to be gang members).42 In each of these situations, insula-
tion 4 3 from other prisoners may be appropriate for some period of time.
But the collection of other conditions that accompany segregation-loss
of employment, contact visits, phone calls, and limited reading materi-
al-may be at best unnecessary and at worst harmful.
The significance of these related conditions cannot be overstated.
Dr. Craig Haney, one of the nation's foremost mental health experts on
solitary confinement, has observed, "Although social deprivation is at the
core of solitary confinement, and what seemingly accounts for its most
intense psychological pain and the greatest risk of harm, prison isolation
units also deprive prisoners of more than social contact."" He notes the
"characteristically high levels of repressive control, enforced idleness,
reduced environmental stimulation, and physical deprivations," all of
which, he says, "lead to psychological distress and can create even more
lasting negative consequences."45 Haney further observes that "most of
the things that we know are beneficial to prisoners-such as increased
participation in institutional programming, visits with persons from out-
side the prison, and so on-are either functionally denied or greatly re-
stricted to prisoners housed in solitary confinement."4 6 And these depri-
vations, both in and of themselves and coupled with social isolation, can
cause a separate set of harms: "In addition to the social pathologies that
40. See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological
Analysis ofSupermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477, 550-51
(1997).
41. Id. at 492-95 (discussing history of solitary confinement and reasons given for its applica-
tion).
42. See id. at 492-93 (discussing rise of use of solitary confinement for gang-related issues);
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Ca. Sept. 10,
2012) (challenging status based isolation in California).
43. We borrow this term from Fred Cohen, who uses it to distinguish separation of a prisoner
from penal isolation, which includes deprivations of sensory and social stimulation, as well as exer-
cise, reading material, telephone access, and educational and vocational programming. Cohen, supra
note 30, at 1037.
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are created by the experience of solitary confinement, . . . these other
stressors also can produce their own negative psychological effects."47
Under the current Eighth Amendment framework, however, prison
officials are not required to justify the specific deprivations that comprise
supermax confinement. Because a generalized assertion of "security"
often suffices to demonstrate a legitimate penological interest, prison
administrators have no incentive to tailor the particular conditions of
confinement to the purpose for which the person is placed there. Unsur-
prisingly, generalized assertions that conditions are necessary-and judi-
cial deference to those assertions-pervade Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, leaving the attendant conditions of supermax prisons largely un-
examined.
II. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: THE DISABILITY RIGHTS STATUTES
Given the concerns associated with an Eighth Amendment ap-
proach, the Civil Rights Clinic began exploring alternative ways to chal-
lenge the component parts of supermax confinement. The federal disabil-
ity rights statutes-the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 48 and
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) 49-provided this opportunity for
prisoners in solitary confinement who have mental illnesses that rise to
the level of a disability.50 For those prisoners, the ADA and RA permit
challenges to each of the underlying conditions that comprise supermax
confinement (access to education, telephone calls, books, etc.) on the
theory that the denial of each service or privilege-if withheld because
of a prisoner's disability-may constitute an act of discrimination.
In the remainder of this Essay, we discuss how a disability discrim-
ination claim on behalf of a mentally ill prisoner in solitary confinement
might look. This discussion is grounded in the work and thinking of the
students and faculty in the Civil Rights Clinic, especially those who liti-
gated a similar claim over the past several years.51 We offer this frame-
work as a possible vehicle for some prisoners with mental illness to chal-
lenge supermax conditions. Yet, we also have the goal of demonstrating
a way to conceptualize the burden that the state might shoulder when
placing a prisoner in segregation and determining the particular condi-
tions of his confinement. The disability discrimination paradigm demon-
47. Id.
48. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2006 & Supp. V
2011), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
50. We are grateful to the attorneys at Fox & Robertson, P.C., our co-counsel in Anderson v.
Colorado Department of Corrections, for their work with us in developing these theories.
51. The case is Anderson v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D.
Colo. 2012). Three generations of Civil Rights Clinic students have represented Troy Anderson in
his claims against the State, culminating in a bench trial held earlier this year. The student attorneys
were Patrick Curnalia, Ashley Wheeland, Lee Knox, Courtney Longtin, Matt Court, Katherine
Hartigan, Maha Kamal, and Brenden Desmond.
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strates that it is possible to place the burden of justification on the prison
officials, and for this requirement to be specific. Examining each of the
various conditions comprising supermax confinement also highlights the
punitive (sometimes-draconian) nature of supermax prisons, in that it
becomes clear that many of the conditions and restrictions do not serve
any legitimate purpose. As detailed below, although prison officials may
espouse safety as the reason for a deprivation, there often is no evidence
or apparent basis to support this claim. We believe that a similar ap-
proach should be incorporated into the Eighth Amendment framework,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court's directive to avoid generalized
deference to prison officials in conditions of confinement litigation.
A. The Federal Disability Discrimination Statutes: A Brief Overview
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities on
the basis of disability.52 The Rehabilitation Act, the precursor to the
ADA, prohibits such discrimination by recipients of federal funding." To
state a claim under these statutes, the plaintiff must allege that "(1) he is
a qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was excluded from par-
ticipation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, pro-
grams, or activities, and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or dis-
crimination was by reason of a disability."5 4
A person has a qualifying disability when he has a physical or men-
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life ac-
tivities, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment. 5 The name or diagnosis of an impairment does not make a
person disabled; rather, it is whether the impairment affects the person's
ability to perform a "major life activity," which is statutorily defined to
include learning, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, as well as
the operation of neurological and brain functions (among others).5 6 Sig-
nificantly, several circuits have determined that an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a person's ability to interact with others qualifies as a
disability.57
The second element of an ADA or RA claim is that the plaintiff
must demonstrate that he is being denied "services, programs or activi-
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). Because most prisons, including state facilities, typically receive
federal financial assistance, virtually all of them are subject to liability pursuant to the RA.
54. Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007).
55. ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 705 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2006).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Additionally, the determina-
tion of whether a person's "impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made with-
out regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as ... medication ... or learned
behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications." § 12102(4)(a)(4)(E)(i).
57. See infra Part l.C. 1.
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ties"58 that he is qualified to receive. Services, programs, and activities
include essentially "anything a public entity does."59 Because prisoners
have virtually every aspect of their lives controlled by the correctional
department, almost any official activity in which inmates participate is
within the scope of the ADA and RA. 6 0 Examples of covered services
include phone calls, visits, job opportunities, educational courses, and
access to reading material. Per the statutes, a prisoner must be "quali-
fied" to receive these services. The prisoner is so "qualified" as long as
the services are provided by the correctional department (or potentially
within the prison where the individual is housed).
The third element of a prima facie claim under the disability rights
statutes is that the prisoner-plaintiff was discriminated against on the
basis of his disability. 62 Under the ADA and RA, the denial of equal ac-
cess to services for behavior resulting from a disability constitutes dis-
crimination regardless of the specific intent motivating the denial. 6 3 Un-
der the regulations implementing the ADA, discrimination is defined to
include "[d]eny[ing] a qualified individual with a disability the oppor-
tunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service" or af-
fording a disabled person "an opportunity to participate in or benefit
from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded oth-
ers."64 Additionally, the antidiscrimination mandate of the disability
rights statutes prohibits public entities from "utiliz[ing] criteria or meth-
ods of administration . .. that have the effect of subjecting qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability."65
Finally, the disability rights statutes require public entities to make
"reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility."66 Accordingly, if a prison offers educational courses but does not
58. Department of Justice General Prohibitions Against Discrimination, 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(1)(i), (ii) (2012).
59. Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (discuss-
ing ADA regulations and concluding that they state that the statute's "broad language is intended to
'appl[y] to anything a public entity does."' (alterations in original) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.102)),
aff'd, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
60. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211.
61. Title II of the ADA states that a "[q]ualified individual with a disability" is a person with
a disability "who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2006).
62. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 ("No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.").
63. See id.; James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against
State Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 651, 726-27 (1999) (noting that Congress intended the ADA to protect against not only
discrimination motivated by malicious intent but also that resulting from indifference).
64. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
65. § 35.130(b)(3)(i).
66. § 35.130(b)(7).
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provide a means for prisoners with vision or hearing impairments to ac-
cess those courses, the denial is discriminatory. Further, the accommoda-
tion mandate is intended to be flexible in order to address each individu-
al's situation; for example, it may require Braille materials or a reader for
a blind prisoner, or a sign-language interpreter or written materials for a
deaf prisoner.
In certain situations-typically involving prisoners with physical
disabilities who have been placed in solitary confinement-courts have
ruled that a prison's denial of equal services constitutes discrimination on
the basis of disability and issued remedial orders to the prison.6 1 If a
prisoner is placed in solitary confinement solely because of his disabil-
ity-for example, a wheelchair user who is housed in a segregation unit
because that is the only part of the prison that contains wheelchair-
accessible cells-courts have held that there is no basis for also denying
him access to the educational programs and other services that are typi-
cally associated with segregated confinement.6 1 Some of these courts
have parsed the various conditions that comprise segregation, and held
that the only permitted deprivations are those that prison officials can
demonstrate are necessary and "fundamental" 6 9 to the goals of the prison.
For example, the Ninth Circuit determined that although segregation of
disabled prisoners was shown to serve legitimate safety goals, there was
no basis to deny the prisoners access to educational and other program-
ming.7 0 If denial of a program or service is unnecessary, courts have
found such denials to constitute additional "punishment" that is not justi-
fied and have ordered prisons to modify the programs to make them ac-
cessible to and usable by prisoners with disabilities.7'
Once a prisoner has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, prison officials can raise an affirmative defense. Because the disa-
bility rights statutes require only reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, and procedures, modifications will not be required where they
would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activi-
ty."7 2 In the prison context, the reasonable modification-fundamental
67. See Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 2008); Love v.
Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that denying quadriplegic prisoner
housed in infirmary access to programs violated the ADA).
68. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1221.
69. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
70. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1220-22; see also § 35.130(h) ("A public entity may impose legiti-
mate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of its services programs or activities.
However, the public entity must ensure that its safety requirements are based on actual risks, not on
mere speculation, stereotypes or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.").
71. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1221-22.
72. § 35.130(b)(7). In the employment context, the classic example of a fundamental altera-
tion (there termed "undue hardship") is a blind person who seeks employment as a bus driver. Be-
cause the accommodation required for the person to perform the essential functions of the job (driv-
ing the bus) is so onerous-i.e., a sighted person having to do (or very closely guide) the actual
driving-provision of the accommodation would constitute an undue hardship and therefore is not
required.
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alteration doctrine has the effect of placing the burden on prison officials
to demonstrate why denial of a particular service, benefit, program, or
activity is necessary. Because the accommodations should be specific
and individualized, prison officials must demonstrate why in each case
the particular prisoner cannot receive the requested services. As a result,
it becomes more difficult for the prison to rely on generalized assertions
of "safety" to support the deprivations and instead forces an articulation
of the reason for the particular condition. In this way, the disability rights
statutes do not render irrelevant the penological concerns of prison offi-
cials, but compared with the Eighth Amendment, the prison's burden to
demonstrate the necessity of a particular denial is both heavier and more
clearly defined.
B. Anderson v. Colorado Department of Corrections
As discussed by Hafemeister and George, many prisoners held in
solitary confinement have mental health issues that qualify as impair-
ments.7 Yet there have been very few cases brought by prisoners with
mental illnesses that have challenged the individual deprivations com-
prising solitary confinement. One of the CRC's cases, Anderson v. Colo-
rado Department of Corrections,7 4 proved to be suitable for a novel chal-
lenge under the disability rights statutes. Mr. Anderson is a mentally ill
man who had been isolated in one of the state supermax prisons, Colora-
do State Penitentiary (CSP), for more than a decade. Mr. Anderson-
unlike many people held at CSP-did not seek to be removed from soli-
tary confinement. Despite his desire to leave isolation, Mr. Anderson
believed there was a legitimate reason to keep him there: the particular
combination of his mental illnesses had previously caused him to act out
impulsively and violently,75 and he was afraid that if he were put in a
general-population unit without adequate mental health treatment, history
would repeat itself.
73. Hafeneister & George, supra note 2, at 38-39.
74. No. 10-cv-01005-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 3643063 (D. Colo. Aug. 24, 2012). In this case,
Mr. Anderson asserted three theories under the ADA and the RA: first, that the prison's failure to
provide him necessary medication to treat his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) con-
stituted a denial of services on the basis of his disability; second, that the prison's refusal to provide
the treatment for his ADHD that would enable him to participate in a program through which he
could progress out of isolation constituted a discriminatory failure to make reasonable modifications
in policies and practices; and third, that to the extent that his mental illness disability requires Mr.
Anderson to be insulated from other prisoners, the automatic denial of other services and benefits
such as outdoor access, books, educational programs, canteen items, etc., discriminated against him
on the basis of his disability. It is the third theory that is discussed in this Essay.
75. In the lawsuit, it was undisputed that Mr. Anderson is diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, polysubstance abuse (in remission in a controlled environment), dysthymic
disorder, antisocial disorder, and personality disorder not otherwise specified with borderline and
narcissistic features. Mental health expert Dr. Raymond Patterson explained that these disorders lead
to inability to concentrate, impulsivity, violence, self-injury, and difficulty focusing. Dr. Patterson
explained that this constellation of symptoms both led to Mr. Anderson's placement in isolation, and
prevented him from participating in necessary therapies and progressing out of solitary confinement.
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Mr. Anderson desperately wanted mental health care, though in the
event that treatment was unsuccessful in resolving his behaviors, he was
willing to stay in the supermax in order to preserve everyone's safety. If
indefinite supermax confinement was to be his fate, however, Mr. An-
derson wanted the onerous and punitive conditions associated with CSP
confinement to be lessened. CSP has many of the deprivations typically
found in supermax confinement: prisoners are allowed to own only two
books, they receive a very limited number of phone calls, all of their
visits are non-contact, educational programming is extremely limited and
correspondence courses are not permitted, canteen access (which in-
cludes food and hygiene items) is severely limited, and the ability to hold
any job is limited to one porter position per unit. In addition, CSP sub-
jects prisoners to some conditions that are even more severe than those
found in many supermax units. For example, CSP prisoners accrue only
a fraction of the earned time credits available to prisoners in general-
population units, resulting in longer periods of incarceration. Additional-
ly, prisoners at CSP are denied all outdoor access; their only exercise
occurs alone in an empty, indoor cell.
A traditional approach to this case would have been to challenge
Mr. Anderson's placement in solitary confinement as violative of the
Eighth Amendment and to seek his removal from CSP. Yet, because of
Mr. Anderson's concerns, the complaint drafted by the student team did
not request removal; instead, it raised challenges to the supermax condi-
tions under the ADA and the RA. In one of these challenges, we sought
to parse "solitary confinement" into its elements and remove those that
were not justified by safety or another legitimate interest. Although Mr.
Anderson conceded the interest in insulating him from other prisoners
(absent successful mental health treatment), he disputed that this interest
required him to be denied services such as books, education, and outdoor
exercise. The prison officials could argue that "safety" justified his isola-
tion, but arguments that he was too unsafe for books and outdoor exer-
cise were unpersuasive because these "benefits" were provided to other
high-security prisoners without issue. Placing the burden on the prison
officials to justify the denials made it apparent that much of the treatment
in solitary confinement is unnecessarily punitive and discriminatory,
even if it may not always reach the level of being declared "cruel and
unusual."
C. The Case Against Segregation Under the American with Disabilities
Act and Rehabilitation Act
In this final subpart, we discuss the elements of the ADA and RA
claims in Mr. Anderson's case and explain how the disability rights stat-
76. These two claims require identical showings of proof, with the exception that cases
brought under the RA must be against entities that receive federal funding.
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utes might be used in similar lawsuits with the effect of more firmly
placing the burden on the state to justify the various conditions and re-
strictions comprising solitary confinement.
1. Disabled by Mental Illness
The first requirement of an ADA or RA claim is that the plaintiff
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits his ability to
perform a major life activity. In some ways, Mr. Anderson is emblematic
of many prisoners who are put in solitary confinement. He has a history
of extensive and varied diagnoses that reach back to his childhood years,
which include bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, depres-
sion, anxiety, polysubstance dependence, and attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (ADHD).n Expert witnesses and prison mental health
staff testified that these disorders impaired Mr. Anderson's ability to
think, learn, concentrate, and to interact with others. Although Mr. An-
derson was receiving some mental health treatment, his severe ADHD
impaired his ability to participate in therapy because he could not con-
centrate or learn the cognitive and behavioral therapies offered by his
psychologist.
Although each individual prisoner's disability will vary, many peo-
ple in administrative segregation may qualify as disabled within the
meaning of the disability rights statutes because their mental illnesses
significantly impair their ability to interact with others. 78 Indeed, the ina-
bility to interact with others, which often results from mental illness, is
the main reason that many people are placed in solitary confinement.
While the nature and extent of such an impairment would be a factual
question appropriate for determination on an individualized basis, it is
plausible that a significant number of prisoners in administrative segre-
gation are disabled because of a mental impairment that substantially
limits their ability to interact with other people. In Mr. Anderson's case,
77. Interestingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations implementing
Title I of the ADA (which applies to private employers) state that the following mental illnesses will
usually be considered disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008: "major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compul-
sive disorder, and schizophrenia." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2012).
78. Although somewhat controversial, many circuits have found that a severe limitation in the
ability to interact with others is a protected disability under the ADA or RA. See Jacques v. DiMar-
zio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004). A harder question is what distinguishes a mental im-
pairment that substantially limits a person's ability to interact with others from maliciousness (or
even simple grouchiness). The Second Circuit answered this question by explaining that an employ-
ee is disabled when his ability to "connect with others" is significantly impaired, as evidenced by his
inability "to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among other people-at
the most basic level of those activities." Id.
Additionally, a point to consider is whether some prisoners are actually disabled as a
result oftheir isolation. Evidence shows that prisoners who spend years in solitary confinement have
predictable problems when required to integrate back into society. Studies indicate that they suffer
anxiety at being around people, sometimes have auditory and visual hallucinations, and have higher
re-offense and recidivism rates upon release. See generally Haney & Lynch, supra note 40, at 496-
539 (discussing recognized effects of solitary confinement).
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the prison officials continued to hold him in solitary confinement be-
cause of negative interactions with staff members; his record contained
numerous inappropriate comments he had made to staff and these were
relied upon to keep him in isolation. Similarly, many prisoners may have
records indicating that the basis for their placement in isolation is an ina-
bility to interact with others, 7 9 as most prisoners are placed there either
because of unsafe behavior or for their own security, both hallmarks of
an inability to interact with others.
2. Services
The second element of an ADA or RA claim is that the plaintiff is
being denied access to services, programs, and activities for which he is
qualified. This element of a disability discrimination claim is the least
complicated to prove. All prisons have numerous programs and services;
nearly every activity during a prisoner's day qualifies as a "service" or
"benefit" under the statutes. Because the services are provided to prison-
ers as part of their incarceration, most prisoners are "qualified" to receive
them.80 Almost as a matter of course, placement in a supermax unit re-
sults in prisoners being denied many services that are available in open-
population units. In Mr. Anderson's case, we asserted that he was denied
numerous services as a result of his administrative segregation place-
ment. Most obviously, he was not permitted many of the services provid-
ed to general-population prisoners: outdoor exercise, reading material,
phone calls, contact visits, most canteen items, and mental health treat-
ment commensurate with the community standard of care.81
3. Cause of the Deprivation
The most difficult aspect of a disability discrimination claim is es-
tablishing that the deprivation is occurring "on the basis of," or because
79. Another way to demonstrate a disability under the ADA and RA is to show that a person
is "regarded as" having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(g)(1)(iii) (2012). Some prisoners who believe they are able to function in an open prison
population may be able to show that they are being discriminated against because the prison regards
them as being disabled due to an inability to interact.
80. Of course, certain benefits may be limited by location (particular prison or unit) or by
another qualification (e.g., some jobs may require specific prior training or experience).
81. In Colorado, as in most state correctional systems, its own policies stated that prisoners
would receive medical and mental health care treatment that is at the "community standard." Yet,
Mr. Anderson was being denied medications and therapies that are considered standard for his disor-
ders. For example, CDOC denied almost everyone stimulant medications (Adderall, Ritalin), which
are universally regarded as the most effective treatments in the community. The prison claimed that
to provide these medications caused a security risk (i.e., a legitimate penological interest), however,
because some individuals did receive them it remained questionable whether their provision would
constitute a "fundamental alteration" of services. Second, we alleged that these drugs would be a
reasonable accommodation to permit Mr. Anderson to participate in state programs such as mental
health therapy and the progression program that would allow him to progress out of solitary con-
finement.
72 [Vol. 90:1
2012] SUPERMAX: DISABILITY DISCRIMNATION APPROACH 73
of, the prisoner's disability. 82 Under this requirement, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he was placed or retained in solitary confinement as a
result of behavior resulting from his disability. For example, if a prisoner
were required to complete an educational program to progress out of
solitary confinement, he would be held there "by reason of' his disability
if that disability (or the prison's failure to accommodate it) kept him
from completing the program.
In Mr. Anderson's situation, there was little question that he was
housed in administrative segregation based on his behavior; his cluster of
disorders caused him to act impulsively and inappropriately. 84 These
outbursts resulted in Mr. Anderson receiving numerous incident reports
for rule violations that prevented him from progressing out of solitary
confinement. In an Eighth Amendment context, these types of incidents
typically would be used by a prison to justify isolation. Here, however,
they served as evidence that Mr. Anderson's disability-caused behavior
was the reason he remained in solitary confinement. Mr. Anderson testi-
fied about how he wanted to improve his behavior-in particular, his
interaction with others-but could not control his outbursts and threaten-
ing interactions. His prison record was replete with proof of his sincerity
and his attempts to improve through mental health counseling and drug
therapy. His situation is likely analogous to many people in prison; the
reasons they are held in solitary confinement ultimately relate to their
mental illnesses.
4. "Fundamental Alteration"
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is made under the ADA
or RA, prison officials may claim that to make modifications to their
policies and practices in supermax units would constitute a "fundamental
85
alteration" to their services, programs, and activities. In Mr. Anderson's
case, one of the fundamental alteration arguments made by the prison
officials was that the set of deprivations comprising confinement at CSP
was part of the behavioral modification program of the prison, meaning
that the deprivations existed to give Mr. Anderson and other prisoners an
incentive to progress out of CSP. Here, however, Mr. Anderson was not
choosing bad behavior; it was caused by his mental illness. For the indi-
vidual deprivations attendant to CSP confinement-loss of phone access,
82. ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 705 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2006).
83. For example, it is discriminatory under the ADA and RA for the prison to require a pro-
gram but not to give a blind prisoner audio or Braille materials, or to fail to provide a learning-
disabled prisoner additional time for testing or other accommodation.
84. Although the State argued that his conduct was volitional, even prison mental health staff
acknowledged that many of his behaviors resulted from his mental illnesses.
85. A prison could also assert that requiring it to permit certain mentally ill prisoners to par-
ticipate in services, programs, or activities would "pose[] a direct threat to the health or safety of
others." 28 C.F.R. § 35.139 (2012). The State did not make this argument in Mr. Anderson's case.
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limited reading material, denial of canteen, and denial of contact visits-
prison officials struggled to give explanations as to why they had an in-
terest in denying these services to a prisoner who is in long-term isola-
tion and does not appear to be close to progressing out, especially when
the purpose of the denial-behavior modification-is rendered irrelevant
by virtue of Mr. Anderson's disability. And because the ADA and RA
require individualized accommodations, the prison officials had difficul-
ty claiming that one prisoner could not be treated differently from oth-
ers.86
Although multiple and varied fundamental alteration arguments ex-
ist in different contexts, the disability rights statutes place prison officials
in a defensive posture, requiring them to justify the various denials that
comprise segregated confinement. If a prisoner is denied a service or
benefit based on his disability, discrimination has occurred unless the
entity can provide sufficient justification for the denial. In contrast to the
amorphous role that penological interest plays in an Eighth Amendment
analysis, the disability rights statutes place the burden on the prison to
explain why a deprivation or practice is necessary. For example, while
prison officials may successfully assert that it would be a fundamental
alteration to allow a person in solitary confinement more access to other
prisoners, it often will be harder for them to demonstrate why reduced
phone calls or limited access to educational correspondence classes are
necessary. In this way, it may be possible to challenge aspects of the
isolation itself, such as the refusal to permit contact visits with family
members, or the denial of additional reading materials or correspondence
courses.87
Although the disability discrimination framework cannot be incor-
porated wholesale into the Eighth Amendment context, it does offer two
features that are lacking in current Eighth Amendment supermax juris-
prudence: the ability to examine the specific components of solitary con-
finement and the imposition of a requirement on the State to justify those
specific conditions. Disability discrimination litigation demonstrates that
it is possible and practicable to require more from the State, a lesson that
could be imported into the Eighth Amendment context to better align it
with the Amendment's purpose of serving as a check on government
power.
86. Indeed, CSP's own progression and regression programs contemplate different privileges
being granted and removed based on individual behavior. See COLO. DEPT. OF CORR. ADMIN. REG.
No. 650-03 § IV(G)(1), ADMIN. SEGREGATION (2012).
87. Ultimately, in Mr. Anderson's case, the court did not reach this issue, focusing instead on
the two other ADA and RA claims asserting discrimination based on the prison's failure to make the
necessary modifications to its policies for Mr. Anderson to receive appropriate medication.
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CONCLUSION
To be sure, a disability discrimination approach to challenging soli-
tary confinement is not a perfect solution. It does not solve the epidemic
of penal isolation, nor does it even ensure that mentally ill prisoners will
be kept out of isolation. But in those cases where the legitimate interest
in isolation may undermine an Eighth Amendment claim, or where the
need for insulation from other prisoners is conceded, the disability rights
statutes provide a vehicle for making incremental improvements to su-
permax confinement. The ADA and RA provide a more nuanced ap-
proach to addressing the collection of conditions that a mentally ill per-
son in a supermax endures, requiring prison officials to justify the need
for each deprivation of a service or benefit in order to continue the deni-
al. This approach can be used to benefit individual prisoners and, we
hope, as a template for the direction that courts should move toward in
the Eighth Amendment arena.
